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INTRODUCTION
Of all of the freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights, perhaps none
inspire the level of interest and debate among both scholars and laypersons as the freedom of speech. The First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States of America guarantees that “Congress shall make no
* Cornell University, B.A., 2014; Cornell Law School, J.D., 2017; Articles Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 102. Thank you to the editors at the Cornell Journal of Law
and Public Policy for their valuable insights and hard work. I would also like to express my
deep gratitude to my family and friends for their continued encouragement and support.
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law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,”1 and it has
long been held that “speech” encompasses not merely spoken words but
any conduct which is “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”2
One of the First Amendment’s purposes is the protection of unpopular speech.3 Indeed, if it protected only popular speech then the Amendment’s prohibition of government abridgment would be largely
unnecessary. Popular speech is protected not only by the First Amendment but by all manner of societal mores, social norms, and national
institutions. Unpopular speech is not so fortunate, and yet the nature of
our freedom of speech is such that it functions as “a guarantee that audiences will be confronted with messages they oppose.”4
Of course, exposure to unpopular ideas and beliefs is not always
pleasant for an audience, and even in the most liberal nations there may
occasionally be private actors who, when confronted with such speech,
choose to react by threatening to end the speaker’s expression. When the
government responds to such potentially disruptive threats by suppressing the speaker’s right to free expression, it has engaged in what is
known as a heckler’s veto of that expression.5 The judiciary responded to
such situations by developing the “heckler’s veto doctrine,” a part of
First Amendment jurisprudence which clearly rejects the heckler’s veto
as a legitimate ground upon which to ban speech.6 The doctrine emphasizes that private individuals cannot use their own threats or acts of violence or disruption as a basis for essentially enlisting the government to
prevent public speech. Indeed, instead of suppressing speech that is potentially disruptive, the government is required to protect those whose
controversial speech is under threat from hecklers and disruptors.7
1

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 409 (1974)).
3 Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., 805 F.3d 228, 243 (6th Cir. 2015) (saying that the
First Amendment “applies to loathsome and unpopular speech with the same force as it does to
speech that is celebrated and widely accepted”).
4 Recent Case: First Amendment – Student Speech – Ninth Circuit Denies Motion to
Rehear En Banc Decision Permitting School Suppression of Potentially Violence-Provoking
Speech. – Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 2014 WL 1400871 [hereinafter Ninth Circuit Denies Motion to Rehear], 128 HARV. L.
REV. 2066, 2066 (2015).
5 See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 2014)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
6 Id.; see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (“It is firmly settled that
under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because
the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”).
7 See Cheryl A. Leanza, Reclaiming the First Amendment: Constitutional Theories of
Media Reform: Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1308 (2007) (“The relevance of heckler’s veto case law lies in its strong
commitment to fulfilling the First Amendment’s ultimate goal of allowing viewpoints to be
2
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By its very nature, the heckler’s veto doctrine pits “the protection of
this individual freedom [of speech] . . . against society’s interest in keeping the peace.”8 This conflict between two fundamental interests is similarly present in another strain of First Amendment jurisprudence: the
“school speech” doctrine, which lays out the extent of public school students’ right to free expression.9 Teachers and administrators must deal
with “the inherent tension between addressing the problem of bullying
and protecting the free speech rights of students,” a tension that is manifested in the public school’s dual interests of “ensuring safe learning environments for all students and protecting student free speech.”10 Their
unenviable task has only become more difficult in the wake of Morse v.
Frederick, the Supreme Court’s most recent foray into student speech
rights, which has had the unfortunate effect of further muddling school
speech jurisprudence.11 This lack of clear guidance from the judiciary
has left school officials “to make on-the-ground choices that at best recognize only one interest, and at worst result in litigation from the offended side.”12
It was exactly this kind of litigation that was the subject of Dariano
v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, the Ninth Circuit’s recent attempt
to sort out the murky intersection of the heckler’s veto doctrine with the
school speech doctrine.13 In the case, a divided court sided with the
school officials who had banned peaceful student expression over fears
of a reaction from the students’ classmates.14 I will explore how this
ruling not only runs counter to the spirit of both the heckler’s veto and
school speech doctrines, but also creates a split with the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits, which in recent years have found heckler’s veto concerns applicable in the case of student speech.15
expressed, even when violence is in the offing . . . . [I]n heckler’s veto cases the courts have
required the state to ensure dissemination of clashing and unpopular views.”).
8 Ninth Circuit Denies Motion to Rehear, supra note 4, at 2066; see also Leanza, supra
note 7, at 1306 (arguing that heckler’s veto cases “illustrate the fundamental conflict between
two members of the public with competing speech goals and the role of the state in promoting
the dissemination of messages”).
9 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400 (2007).
10 Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., Maddening Choices: The Tension Between Bullying and the
First Amendment in Public Schools, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 364, 364 (2013).
11 See Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Path from Tinker to Morse: How the Student
Speech Cases Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions – for the Law and for the Litigants,
63 FLA. L. REV. 1407, 1442 (2011).
12 Negrón, supra note 10, at 364.
13 Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 773–75 (9th Cir. 2014)
(McKeown, J., dissenting).
14 See id. at 779. The students in question were wearing American flag t-shirts on the day
of a school-sanctioned Cinco de Mayo celebration. Administrators were concerned about the
potential for disruptions from upset Mexican-American students. See id. at 774–75.
15 See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“Statements that while not fighting words are met by violence or threats or other unprivileged
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Part I of this Note explores the nature and development of the heckler’s veto doctrine, paying particular attention to the doctrine’s roots in
the Civil Rights movement. It also discusses the present scope of the
doctrine, especially with regards to the doctrine’s applicability in the
public school context. Part II provides a history of the Supreme Court’s
school speech jurisprudence beginning with the Tinker16 decision in
1969 and ending with the Morse17 decision in 2007. It will also explore
the fallout from the latter and its impact on the school speech doctrine at
large. Part III explores Dariano in more detail, focusing on the main
themes and arguments of both the majority and the dissent. Further, it
lays out the nature of the circuit split on the issue of the heckler’s veto’s
applicability in public schools. Finally, Part IV attempts to provide a solution for the Court that attempts to reaffirm the free speech rights of
students while respecting the discretion of public school officials and
their continued efforts to create and maintain safe, productive learning
environments for students.
I. THE HECKLER’S VETO: PAST

AND

PRESENT

While the text of the First Amendment indicates a focus on protecting private speech from government interference, the heckler’s veto doctrine at its core is a response to concerns over what one scholar termed
“one of the pariahs of First Amendment jurisprudence”: permitting “one
person (the ‘heckler’) in the audience who objects to the speaker’s words
to silence a speaker.”18 This is a heckler’s veto, and even though it is
fundamentally a private check on speech, it still runs counter to the spirit
of the First Amendment’s free speech protections.19 This is because
courts have interpreted our free speech rights to extend beyond mere pro-

retaliatory conduct by persons offended by them cannot lawfully be suppressed because of that
conduct.”); Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“Allowing a school to curtail a student’s freedom of expression based on [threats of violence]
turns reason on its head . . . [T]o do so, however, is to sacrifice freedom upon the altar of
order, and allow the scope of our liberty to be dictated by the inclinations of the unlawful
mob.”).
16 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
17 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
18 John J. McGuire, The Sword of Damocles Is Not Narrow Tailoring: The First Amendment’s Victory in Reno v. ACLU, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413, 417 n.16 (1998).
19 See Frye v. Kan. City Mo. Police Dep’t, 375 F.3d 785, 792 (2004) (Beam, J., dissenting) (“When the government enforces a heckler’s veto, it infringes upon the First Amendment’s most vital role.”); see also Richard F. Duncan, Just Another Brick in the Wall: The
Establishment Clause as a Heckler’s Veto, 18 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 255, 264–65 (2014)
(“[T]he evil in heckler’s veto situations is that it empowers hecklers to ‘silence any speaker of
whom they do not approve.’”) (quoting another source).
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tection from government suppression and penalization of speech.20 First
Amendment speech rights include the right to try to convince others to
adopt one’s own views and the right to hear views and opinions that help
us form our own opinions, even if the majority seeks to squelch certain
viewpoints.21 Understanding the doctrine’s importance in the school
speech context requires exploring its judicial roots.
A. The Development and Evolution of the Heckler’s Veto Doctrine
The heckler’s veto doctrine was not established in a single sweeping
decision. Rather, it grew out of the clear and present danger doctrine, an
earlier segment of First Amendment jurisprudence.22 The embryo of the
modern heckler’s veto doctrine can be traced to the Supreme Court’s
1949 decision in Terminiello v. City of Chicago,23 a case whose language
can be found in many of the Court’s ensuing heckler’s veto cases.24 The
plaintiff in Terminiello was arrested and charged with breach of the
peace while giving a racially inflammatory speech in a private auditorium.25 The police were concerned about the size and rowdiness of the
audience and had been unable to prevent several disturbances from
breaking out.26 Writing for a divided Court, Justice Douglas eloquently
laid out the philosophical underpinnings of what was to become the
heckler’s veto doctrine:
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion . . . . Accordingly, a
function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech,
20 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (“The right to free speech, of course,
includes the right to attempt to persuade others to change their views, and may not be curtailed
simply because the speaker’s message may be offensive to his audience.”).
21 See Duncan, supra note 19, at 265 (discussing how one of the main reasons for protecting free speech is so that prospective listeners can engage with diverse perspectives).
Preventing people from enlisting the government to suppress speech is key to ensuring that
First Amendment protections are not subject to private whims. See Leanza, supra note 7, at
1308 (describing the heckler’s veto doctrine’s “strong commitment to fulfilling the First
Amendment’s ultimate goal of allowing viewpoints to be expressed”).
22 See Leanza, supra note 7, at 1308.
23 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
24 See Leanza, supra note 7, at 1309.
25 See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 2–3.
26 Id.
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though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against
censorship or punishment . . . .27
Justice Douglas proceeded to throw out the plaintiff’s conviction, noting
that a conviction based on one’s speech “[stirring] people to anger, [inviting] public dispute, or [bringing] about a condition of unrest” could
not stand.28
Two years later, the Court took a step away from its Terminiello
reasoning in Feiner v. New York,29 another case involving a racially
charged speech in front of an unruly audience. The plaintiff in this case,
Mr. Feiner, was similarly arrested and convicted of breaching the peace
after he refused to cease and desist under orders from the police, who
were concerned that a fight was about to break out among the crowd.30
Writing for the majority, Justice Vinson affirmed the conviction on the
grounds that Feiner was attempting to incite a riot and that the crowd was
close to the violent eruption he was supposedly encouraging.31 Justice
Black dissented, noting that the crowd was not as unruly as the majority
said and that the police “did not even pretend to try to protect” Feiner,
nor did they attempt to quiet the crowd.32 Black argued that the Court’s
ruling “means that, as a practical matter, minority speakers can be silenced in any city” simply by threatening violence and disruption.33
Scholars have come to see this dissent as “originating the concept of an
impermissible ‘heckler’s veto.’”34
1. The Heckler’s Veto in the Civil Rights Era
The heckler’s veto doctrine came of age during the civil rights era
of the 1960s, when a series of cases built off of the reasoning and spirit
of Justice Douglas’s opinion in Terminiello and Justice Black’s Feiner
dissent protected the free expression of civil rights protestors.35 The first
of these cases was the Court’s 1963 decision in Edwards v. South Carolina, in which a group of peaceful black protestors was convicted of
breaching the peace after failing to follow police orders to disperse.36
27

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
29 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
30 See id. at 316–18.
31 See id. at 319–21.
32 Id. at 326.
33 Id. at 328.
34 Leanza, supra note 7, at 1308. History would prove Justice Black to be prescient in his
reasoning. Feiner has been limited to its facts by ensuing cases and supplanted by the heckler’s
veto doctrine. See id. at 1309.
35 See Brief for Alliance Defending Freedom as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
[hereinafter Alliance Defending Freedom Brief] at 8, Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch.
Dist., No. 12-720 (Jan. 20, 2015) cert. denied.
36 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 230–34 (1963).
28

R
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The police justified their actions by citing their fears that a group of
onlookers they classified as “possible trouble makers” would cause a disturbance.37 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, emphasized the
peaceful nature of the demonstration and struck down the convictions
using Justice Douglas’s exact language from Terminiello.38
The Court expanded on their ruling in Edwards two years later in
Cox v. Louisiana.39 In that case, a group of students protesting segregation and discrimination marched to a local courthouse, where they listened to a speech which was deemed to be “inflammatory” by the local
sheriff since it led to “muttering” and “grumbling” amongst a group of
white onlookers.40 The demonstrators refused to leave, and the following
day, Mr. Cox, the leader of the march, was arrested and charged with
breach of the peace.41 The Court was highly suspicious of the sheriff’s
version of events, and deemed his fear of violence to be unfounded given
the lack of evidence that the onlookers were becoming violent.42 However, the Court went one step further and proclaimed that the police
could not justify shutting down a peaceful protest based on fears of a
violent reaction from onlookers, even if those fears were justified, because “constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise.”43 The Court struck down the conviction
on the grounds that “Louisiana infringed appellant’s rights of free speech
and free assembly.”44
The first textual appearance of the concept of the heckler’s veto
came in 1966 in the Court’s decision in Brown v. Louisiana.45 As in
Edwards and Cox, the defendants in this case had been charged with
breaching the peace, this time because of a silent protest in a segregated
public library.46 Once again, the Court said that there had been no breach
of the peace, and that even if the peaceful protest had led to a disruptive
reaction from onlookers, “we would have to hold that the [breach of the
peace] statute cannot constitutionally be applied to punish [defendants’]
actions in the circumstances of this case.”47 One particularly important
37

Id. at 231.
See id. at 238 (“As in the Terminiello case, the courts of South Carolina have defined
a criminal offense so as to permit conviction of the petitioners if their speech ‘stirred people to
anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on
any of those grounds may not stand.’”).
39 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
40 Id. at 543.
41 See id. at 543–44.
42 See id. at 550.
43 Id. at 551.
44 Id. at 545.
45 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
46 See id. at 136–37.
47 Id. at 142.
38
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footnote laid out the heckler’s veto doctrine as established to that point
and referred explicitly to the problem of the heckler’s veto: “Participants
in an orderly demonstration in a public place are not chargeable with the
danger, unprovoked except by the fact of the constitutionally protected
demonstration itself, that their critics might react with disorder or
violence.”48
The footnote was inspired by renowned legal scholar Harry
Kalven’s 1965 book The Negro and the First Amendment, in which
Kalven argued that “[i]f the police can silence the speaker, the law in
effect acknowledges a veto power in hecklers who can, by being hostile
enough, get the law to silence any speaker of whom they do not approve.”49 The author was referring to attempts by police to use concerns
over counter-protestor behavior to shut down civil rights protests.
Kalven’s recognition of the significance of this public veto and its potential suppressive impact on unpopular viewpoints underscores the heckler’s veto doctrine’s importance as a guarantor of rights whose
expression is not supported by popular sentiment.
2. Further Development and Expansion
It would be a quarter century before the Supreme Court took up
another heckler’s veto case, but in the interim, the Sixth Circuit helped
clarify the doctrine and the specific role of the state and associated actors. Glasson v. City of Louisville involved a civil rights lawsuit brought
by demonstrators who had been protesting a presidential visit.50 The appellant was peacefully displaying a sign critical of the president when
she began to attract negative attention from a group of onlookers who
were “grumbling and muttering threats.”51 An officer monitoring the situation testified that the group was “hollering” and, concerned for Glasson’s safety, tore up her sign after she refused to do so herself.52
The court noted that the only threat to public safety in this case was
the onlookers, and that the police had demonstrated a “shocking disregard” for both Glasson’s free speech rights and her right to “have her
person and property protected by the state from violence at the hands of
persons in disagreement with her ideas.”53 State actors are not only required to refrain from enforcing a heckler’s veto, but to protect those
exercising their constitutional rights from violent hecklers as long as doing so would not subject those actors to an unreasonably high risk of
48

Id. at 133 n.1.
HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140–41 (Ohio State University Press 1965).
50 Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 901 (6th Cir. 1975)
51 Id. at 902.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 910–11.
49
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violent injury or retaliation.54 The court reiterated the classic reasoning
behind the heckler’s veto doctrine, remarking that allowing the state to
prohibit the expression of supposedly “detrimental” or “injurious” ideas
would “subvert the First Amendment” and “empower an audience to cut
off the expression of a speaker with whom it disagreed.”55 The Glasson
court also clearly laid out what had only been hinted at in the prior heckler’s veto cases: that “state officials are not entitled to rely on community
hostility as an excuse not to protect, by inaction or affirmative conduct,
the exercise of fundamental rights.”56
The Supreme Court would take its turn at expanding and refining
the heckler’s veto doctrine in its 1992 decision in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement.57 The Nationalist Movement, a white supremacist
organization, challenged the constitutionality of Forsyth County’s assembly and parade ordinance, which required groups using public spaces to
pay for their own protection if the costs of providing protection exceeded
normal bounds.58 The county had established the fee in the wake of a
pair of rallies which attracted significant numbers of demonstrators and
counter-demonstrators and resulted in $670,000 of police protection
costs.59 The Court, led by Justice Blackmun, was concerned that the fee
would be administered “based on the content of the speech,” as “[t]he fee
assessed will depend on the administrator’s measure of the amount of
hostility likely to be created by the speech based on its content.”60 Blackmun ruefully remarked that groups “wishing to express views unpopular
with bottle throwers, for example, may have to pay more for their permit.”61 The Court dismissed the county’s argument that the ordinance
was justifiable on the grounds of maintaining order and went on to say
that, just as speech could not be punished because it offended a hostile
audience, neither could it be financially burdened on those grounds.62 In
essence, the case expanded the protection given to unpopular speech
from government actions which had the effect of suppressing said
speech.
The Court’s 1997 decision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union would see the heckler’s veto doctrine expand beyond cases involving protests to embrace a broader scope of controversial speech.63
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

See id. at 907–09.
Id. at 905–06.
Id. at 906 (quoting Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 37 (6th Cir. 1973)).
505 U.S. 123 (1992).
See id. at 126–27.
See id. at 125–26.
Id. at 134.
Id.
See id. at 134–35.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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The Communications Decency Act of 1996 featured a provision
criminalizing the intentional transmission of “obscene or indecent” material to underage individuals, or any material that “depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”64 Almost immediately
after the bill was signed, it was challenged by a number of plaintiffs,
including the American Civil Liberties Union, who claimed that the provisions were unconstitutional.65 The Court was highly concerned about
the possibilities that the provision would chill speech on the internet.66 In
his majority opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the provisions in question “confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a ‘heckler’s
veto,’ upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on
and inform the would-be discoursers that his 17-year-old child . . . would
be present.”67 Although it might appear odd to apply the heckler’s veto
in the context of an impersonal communication where no violence is
threatened, Stevens was simply reapplying the reasoning which the Court
had used in its earlier heckler’s veto cases; “a critical element of the
heckler’s veto [doctrine] is the obligation of the state not to allow public
opposition to shut down a speaker,” regardless of the exact form which
such public opposition might take.68 Above all, this is the core of what
the modern heckler’s veto doctrine seeks to achieve.
B. The Heckler’s Veto in Public Schools
The past two decades have seen the circuit courts extend the heckler’s veto doctrine to the public school context, although as Dariano
demonstrates there is no general agreement as to the doctrine’s scope in
relation to student speech.69 Interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit has
actually endorsed the idea that the heckler’s veto can apply in situations
where special school-specific considerations are in play. Six years before
its Dariano opinion, the court considered Center for Bio-Ethical Reform
v. Los Angeles County Sheriff Department, a case which bears a strong
resemblance to the classic heckler’s veto cases of the civil rights era.70
Here, a pro-life group which was demonstrating in the vicinity of a pub64

Id. at 859–60.
See id. at 861–62.
66 See id. at 880.
67 Id.
68 Leanza, supra note 7, at 1313; see also Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 151–52 (7th
Cir. 1994) (ruling that city aldermen were wrong in removing a controversial painting from an
art exhibition after fears arose that the painting might spark riots in the community. The court
noted that the heckler’s veto doctrine applies both in cases where violence is latent and when it
is presently occurring).
69 See infra Section III.C.
70 Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008).
65
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lic middle school held up signs with graphic pictures of aborted fetuses.71
Upon hearing that some students were planning on throwing rocks at the
display and that others were crying and distraught as a result of seeing
the images, concerned school officials contacted the police.72 The two
demonstrators holding the signs in question were ordered to leave, and
testified that their fears over being arrested had prevented them from
protesting at other schools.73
The court engaged in a heckler’s veto analysis of the California statute at issue in the case, deeming it to be “just the kind of accession to the
heckler’s veto outlawed by the case law” since the demonstrators’ speech
was permissible under the statute “until the students and drivers around
the school reacted to it, at which point the speech was deemed disruptive
and ordered stopped.”74 It then considered what kind of impact the middle school setting should have on the traditional heckler’s veto analysis,
conceding that the presence of children was a “special circumstance”
given that middle school students “may well be particularly susceptible
to distraction or emotion in the face of controversial speech, and may not
always be expected to act responsibly.”75 However, the court declined to
limit the scope of the heckler’s veto in this case on the grounds that there
was “no precedent for a ‘minors’ exception” to the heckler’s veto doctrine and that creating one “would therefore be an unprecedented departure from bedrock First Amendment principles.”76 The Ninth Circuit’s
message in Center for Bio-Ethical Reform seemed clear: a heckler’s veto
that is demanded by public school students is no less unconstitutional
than one demanded by adults.77 However, as Dariano would show, the
court apparently was not prepared to extend such reasoning into the
classroom.78
The same cannot be said for other circuit courts, most notably the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, both of which have implicitly or explicitly embraced heckler’s veto principles in public school settings. In Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, the Eleventh Circuit faced a case in
which the plaintiff, a high school student, sued school officials who punished him after he refused to say the Pledge of Allegiance with the rest of
his class.79 During the pledge the appellant chose to silently raise his fist,
71

See id. at 784.
See id. at 785.
73 See id. at 785–86.
74 Id. at 789.
75 Id. at 790.
76 Id.
77 See id.
78 See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 777–78 (9th Cir. 2014);
see generally infra Section III.A (discussing the Dariano ruling).
79 See Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2004).
72
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a measure which his teacher saw as “unorthodox and deliberately provocative.”80 The court assessed the school’s action through the prism of
the material and substantial interference standard from Tinker,81 as it
could not simply defer to any claims by school officials of “the specter of
disruption or the mere theoretical possibility of discord.”82 The court remarked that “the fact that other students may have disagreed with either
Holloman’s act or the message it conveyed is irrelevant to our analysis”83 and proceeded to implicitly embrace the heckler’s veto doctrine’s
applicability to the situation:
If certain bullies are likely to act violently when a student wears long hair, it is unquestionably easy for a principal to preclude the outburst by preventing the student
from wearing long hair. To do so, however, is to sacrifice freedom upon the alter [sic] of order, and allow the
scope of our liberty to be dictated by the inclinations of
the unlawful mob. . . The fact that other students might
take such a hairstyle as an incitement to violence is an
indictment of those other students, not long hair.84
In essence, the court argued that schools cannot hide behind the expected
or even actual reactions of their students to suppress student speech.
The court acknowledged, as the Ninth Circuit would in Center for
Bio-Ethical Reform, that students did not always receive the same constitutional protections in school as they would outside, but still emphasized
that such protections for students could not be stripped on account of
their classmates’ violent actions.85 The principal’s task of maintaining
order in school could not come at the cost of “turning a blind eye to basic
notions of right and wrong.”86 At its core, Holloman stands as a repudiation of the idea that school officials can count on blind deference by the
courts to their contentions that maintaining a safe learning environment
requires reducing students’ free speech rights.87
The Seventh Circuit was even more explicit in its application of
heckler’s veto principles in the public school context. In Zamecnik v.
80

Id. at 1270.
Under this standard, the school must demonstrate that its limitations on student speech
were designed to prevent a material and substantial interference in the school’s educational
mission. See infra Section II.A.
82 Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1271.
83 Id. at 1274–75.
84 Id. at 1275.
85 See id. at 1275–6.
86 Id.
87 See generally Negrón, supra note 10, at 364 (describing how schools “are faced with
balancing two strongly competing interests: ensuring safe learning environments for all students and protecting free speech.”).
81
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Indian Prairie School District, the court faced a case in which the plaintiffs, students at a public high school, were prevented from wearing “Be
Happy, Not Gay” t-shirts one day after a private student group promoted
a pro-LGBT “Day of Silence.”88 Writing for the majority, Judge Posner
noted that “high school students should not be raised in an intellectual
bubble,” which would be the case if schools forbade discussion of political and social issues during the day.89 He asserted that by banning the tshirts the school was attempting to protect the rights of LGBT students,
but said that this was an invalid justification given that “people in our
society do not have a legal right to prevent criticism of their beliefs or
even their way of life.”90 Posner remarked that the substantial disruption
cases in the Tinker line “do not establish a generalized ‘hurt feelings’
defense to a high school’s violation of the First Amendment rights of its
students,” but added that school officials are entitled to a modicum of
discretion in discerning when speech goes from hurting feelings to substantially disrupting a school’s educational mission.91
Posner proceeded to analyze the school’s forecast of a substantial
disruption, and particularly its contention that student harassment of the
plaintiffs for wearing the shirts counted as such a disruption. He announced that such evidence could not be considered as part of a substantial disruption analysis because doing so would go against the heckler’s
veto doctrine:
Statements that while not fighting words are met by violence or threats or other unprivileged retaliatory conduct
by persons offended by them cannot lawfully be suppressed because of that conduct. Otherwise free speech
could be stifled by the speaker’s opponents’ mounting a
riot, even though, because the speech had contained no
fighting words, no reasonable person would have been
moved to a riotous response.92
Posner was, in fact, more inclined to believe that high schools should be
in the business of promoting debate and discourse rather than trying to
squelch it.93 As the Eleventh Circuit had done in Holloman, the Seventh
Circuit recognized the responsibilities of public schools towards their
88

Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 636 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 876.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 877–78.
92 Id. at 879. This means that the harassment of Zamecnik could not be used by the
school to justify banning the former’s speech. See id.
93 See id. at 878 (arguing that the fact that schools “are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source False The First Amendment . . . is consistent with the
school’s mission to teach by encouraging debate on controversial topics while also allowing
89
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students without using this as an excuse to provide school officials with
carte blanche to censor student speech.94 For our purposes, the important
difference between Holloman and Zamecnik on one hand and Center for
Bio-Ethical Reform on the other is that the former cases recognized the
heckler’s veto in the context of student speech in the classroom, whereas
the latter merely declined to create an exception to the heckler’s veto
doctrine for speech in the vicinity of a public school. This distinction will
become important when analyzing the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent ruling
in Dariano.
II. THE SCHOOL SPEECH DOCTRINE
We have already seen the evolution of the heckler’s veto doctrine
and how it has been applied to public schools at the circuit level, but in
every student speech case, the heckler’s veto issue comes up as part of
the more general school speech analysis. Understanding the prongs of the
school speech doctrine and the confusion surrounding its current state is
essential to knowing the context and importance of Dariano.
A. Tinker and the Substantial Disruption Test
The Supreme Court’s modern school speech jurisprudence began to
take shape in 1969’s Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District.95 The plaintiffs in this case planned to wear black arm
bands to school to protest the Vietnam War.96 In response, the principal
established a policy banning all arm bands, and the plaintiffs had to remove their bands to enter the school.97 The Court began by noting the
special constitutional characteristics of the school setting and the tension
between “affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of
school officials” and protecting the First Amendment rights of students.98
Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas established what would become
known as the substantial disruption standard:
But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression . . . . Any word spoken, in class,
in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from
the views of another person may start an argument or
the school to limit the debate when it becomes substantially disruptive.”) (quoting Nuxoll v.
Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2008)).
94 See id. at 879–80 (noting that schools have “legitimate responsibilities . . . toward the
immature captive audience that consists of [their] students”).
95 See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
96 See id. at 504.
97 See id.
98 Id. at 507.
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cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must
take this risk . . . . Certainly where there is no finding
and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct
would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school,’ [restrictions on student speech] cannot be
sustained.99
Fortas continued by arguing that public schools, despite their unique
characteristics vis-à-vis other public spaces, could not be “enclaves of
totalitarianism” or a “closed-circuit” that fed students state-approved
messages without respecting their students’ fundamental right of expression.100 A desire to avoid the controversy or discord that might arise in
response to the expression of unpopular views is not a justification for
regulating student speech unless there is a material and substantial interference with the operations of the school.101
The substantial disruption standard for regulating student speech has
been further developed in the half century since Tinker was decided.102
Unfortunately, as a result of the individualized nature of the substantial
disruption analysis, courts have generally struggled to define exactly
what a substantial disruption is in marginal cases.103 Additionally, there
remains some confusion as to whether the substantial disruption standard
is concerned only with the speaker or whether third-party disruptions
also must be considered.104 These unresolved issues have created an unfavorable situation for school administrators trying to toe the line between respecting speech rights and preserving productive learning
environments.105
99

Id. at 508–09.
Id. at 511.
101 See id. at 513–14.
102 For instance, it is now commonly accepted that schools do not have to wait for a
substantial disruption to actually occur to regulate student speech, nor must they wait for an
absolute certainty of a disruption; when a school has forecasted a disruption it is up to courts to
decide whether this forecast is reasonable given the circumstances of the case. See Lowery v.
Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 591–93 (6th Cir. 2007).
103 See Shannon M. Raley, Note, Tweaking Tinker: Redefining an Outdated Standard for
the Internet Era, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 773, 795–96 (2011).
104 See Alliance Defending Freedom Brief, supra note 35, at 23.
105 See Charles R. Waggoner, The Impact of Symbolic Speech in Public Schools: A Selective Case Analysis From Tinker to Zamecnik, 3 ADMIN. ISSUES J. 64, 70 (2013) (arguing that
the lack of a consistent principle which can explain judicial rulings in school speech cases
leaves administrators “between the proverbial rock and hard place”). The Tinkers themselves
have lamented how the Supreme Court has declined to elaborate on the kinds of protections
Tinker offers to political speech. See Brief of Amici Curiae Mary Beth Tinker and John Tinker
in Support of Petitioner [hereinafter Tinker Brief] at 11, Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch.
Dist., 745 F.3d 354 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-720), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1700 (2015).
100
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B. Bethel and Kuhlmeier: Adding More Prongs to Tinker
The Supreme Court’s next two school speech cases created additional bases for restricting student speech which are not as important for
our purposes but still necessary for understanding how the doctrine has
evolved. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the plaintiff was a
high school student who gave a crude speech during a school assembly
and was suspended by school administrators.106 Writing for the Court,
Justice Burger upheld the suspension on the grounds that one of the functions of public schools is educating students to “demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct
and deportment in and out of class.”107 Burger emphasized the “special
characteristics of the school environment” which permit schools a degree
of leeway in banning “lewd, indecent or offensive speech and conduct”
that threatens their task of turning students into civil and mature
adults.108 He was careful to distinguish the speech in Fraser from that in
Tinker, noting the “marked distinction between the political ‘message’ of
the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of [Fraser’s] speech.”109
In sum, Fraser granted schools significant deference in banning lewd
and indecent nonpolitical speech.110
Two years later, the Court created another path to restrict student
speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, which involved a
controversial student piece in a school newspaper.111 The teacher who
advised the newspaper prevented an article about teen pregnancy from
being published due to his concerns about the propriety of the material
for a young audience.112 Justice White, writing for the Court, began by
discussing how the “special characteristics of the school environment”
permit schools to regulate speech “even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school.”113 White argued that student
speech rights are not impermissibly abridged when educators regulate the
style and content of speech in student-sponsored activities, provided
“their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”114 Like Fraser, Kuhlmeier affirms that there are multiple ways in
which restrictions of student speech can be justified.115 However, it is
106

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986).
Id. at 683.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 680.
110 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263–64 (1988).
111 Id. at 262
112 See id. at 263–64.
113 Id. at 266.
114 Id. at 273.
115 See id. at 270–71 (“The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker—is different from
107
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important to note that neither case has substantially limited Tinker in
practice.116
C. Morse and the Uncertainty of the Present Doctrine
The Court’s most recent foray into school speech jurisprudence was
in the 2007 decision Morse v. Frederick, in which a student unfurled a
banner saying “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” outside his school while his
classmates were outside to watch the Olympic torch relay.117 The banner
was confiscated and the student, Frederick, was suspended.118 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion quickly honed in on the ostensibly prodrug content of Morse’s banner, noting that the government’s interest in
minimizing drug abuse among students “allow[s] schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug
use.”119 Roberts opined that the speech in Morse was more dangerous to
the school’s mission than the armbands in Tinker given the school’s specific concern in limiting drug abuse, and that this justified the school’s
decision to ban the speech.120 The Court, however, was careful to note
that Fraser “should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit
under some definition of ‘offensive’” given that “much political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some.”121
Justice Alito’s concurrence emphasized Roberts’s point, as he
joined the opinion in the understanding that it only applied to speech
advocating illegal drug use rather than any speech commenting on political and social issues, as school officials do not have “a license to suppress speech on political and social issues based on disagreement with
the viewpoint expressed.”122 Alito worried that Roberts’s opinion could
be interpreted to allow the banning of any speech that goes against a
vague educational mission, which was especially concerning for him
given that a school’s educational mission is defined in part by elected
and appointed officials who see the school’s mission as inculcating their
own political and social views in students.123 He asserted that Morse
does not support restricting speech on political or social issues and that
any restrictions must “be based on some special characteristic of the
school setting.”124
the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”).
116 See Moss, supra note 11, at 1435–36.
117 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
118 Id. at 398.
119 Id. at 408–09.
120 See id. at 408–09.
121 Id. at 409.
122 Id. at 422–23 (Alito, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 423.
124 Id. at 424.
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Thanks in large part to Alito’s decisive concurrence, Morse initially
seemed like a narrow ruling. However, some lower courts have since
used Morse to restrict a wide variety of non-drug-related speech that was
seen as “having the possibility of leading to physical harm.”125 Harper v.
Poway Unified School District, in which a high school student was prevented from wearing an anti-homosexuality t-shirt, is typical of such
cases.126 The court noted the Morse Court’s attempts to limit the scope of
its ruling, but decided that “Morse lends support for a finding that the
speech at issue in the instant case may be properly restricted by school
officials if it is considered harmful.”127 It further asserted that Morse
“affirms that school officials have a duty to protect students . . . from
degrading acts or expressions that promote injury to the student’s physical, emotional or psychological well-being” if they hurt the school’s educational mission.128 Other courts have paid more heed to Justice Alito’s
concurrence and restricted Morse to speech promoting drug use and other
similarly weighty illegality.129 In cases like this, courts read Morse as
“ensuring that political speech will remain protected within the school
setting.”130 Scholars have also come down on both sides of this emerging
split, with some arguing that Morse allows explicit viewpoint discrimination by public schools and others countering that the decision should be
narrowly construed given its strong focus on student safety rather than
offensive or unpopular viewpoints.131 Perhaps the best way to understand
these competing interpretations of Morse is as a disagreement over the
decision’s impact on student speech that doesn’t involve illegal activities
or significant danger to students. Regardless, the unfortunate reality of
the situation is that the Supreme Court has not yet clarified its ruling in
Morse, even as calls have grown “to help schools navigate the tension
between the student speech issues and the increasing national demands
for safe learning environments.”132
125 Ronald C. Schoedel III, Morse v. Frederick: Tinkering with School Speech: Can Five
Years of Inconsistent Interpretation Yield a Hybrid Content-Effects-Based Approach to School
Speech as a Tool for the Prevention of School Violence?, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1633, 1635
(2012).
126 Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1075 (S.D.
Cal. 2008).
127 Id. at 1100.
128 Id. at 1101.
129 See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 769–70 (5th Cir. 2007)
(arguing that Morse is “focused on the particular harm to students of speech advocating drug
use” and that “speech advocating a harm that is demonstrably grave . . . to the physical safety
of students . . . is unprotected”).
130 Id. at 768.
131 See generally Moss, supra note 11, at 1438–40 (providing an overview of the different
scholarly views of the Morse decision and its breadth).
132 Negrón, supra note 10, at 380.
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III. DARIANO V. MORGAN HILL
It was into the clouded and uncertain intersection between the
school speech and heckler’s veto doctrines that the Ninth Circuit stepped
with its ruling in Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District.133 In
deciding that school officials can limit speech that might cause a disruptive reaction, the court created a circuit split on the issue of the heckler’s
veto’s applicability in the context of student speech in public schools.134
The events at the root of Dariano began on May 5, 2010, at Live
Oak High School, a public school that had set the date aside as a celebration of Cinco de Mayo and “the pride and community strength” of its
Mexican-American students.135 Live Oak is a diverse school that has a
history of racially based fights and tension among its students, including
at prior Cinco de Mayo celebrations.136 On the date of the 2010 celebration, a group of white students, including the eventual appellant, wore
American flag shirts to school, prompting concerns among administrators that there might be a repeat of earlier altercations.137 The students
were sent home after refusing to remove their shirts and brought suit
against the district on the grounds that their rights to freedom of expression had been violated.138
A. The Majority Opinion
The court began its analysis by reviewing school speech jurisprudence, especially Tinker’s substantial disruption prong and the discretion
that courts generally afford school officials in determining whether the
threat of such a disruption exists.139 Writing for the majority, Judge McKeown noted the “evidence of nascent and escalating violence at Live
Oak” in the context of the 2009 altercation and deigned the school officials to have reasonably and “presciently avoided an altercation,” thus
satisfying the Tinker substantial disruption test.140 The majority was
careful to distinguish the facts in Dariano from those of Tinker, arguing
that in the present case the measures taken by the vice principal were
minimal restrictions that arose out of a desire to avoid a major disruption
133

Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014).
See id. at 767 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“In [overlooking the heckler’s veto], the
panel creates a split with the Seventh and Eleventh CircuitsFalse”); see generally supra Section I.B. (discussing the Zamecnik and Holloman decisions by the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits).
135 Dariano, 767 F.3d at 774.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 775.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 776.
140 Id. at 776–77.
134
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rather than an “urgent wish to avoid controversy,” as had been the case in
Tinker.141
The court did address the heckler’s veto issue, but only to explain
why it did not apply in Dariano. Judge McKeown explained that “the
language of Tinker and the school setting guides us here,” with the questionable implication that, in the school context, Tinker acts as an override
to any heckler’s veto concerns.142 The majority dismissed the fact that it
was not the speakers who were being disruptive by asserting that there is
no consequential difference between a disruption caused by the speaker
and one caused by the audience.143 However, the case that the court cited
to support this proposition did not involve a heckler’s veto issue, and the
ruling in that case implies that the existence of such a concern would
change the analysis.144 Tellingly, the majority did not substantially engage with the facts of Holloman and Zamecnik, the two circuit court
cases which found the heckler’s veto to apply in the public school context.145 In the end, the court leaned heavily on the language of deference,
emphasizing the difficulties faced by school authorities and signaling
that the court’s job “is not to second-guess” the reasonable actions of
school officials.146
The majority exclusively used a Tinker substantial disruption analysis to arrive at its conclusion,147 but Dariano arguably implicates the
Supreme Court’s Morse ruling as well. The majority in Dariano emphasized how the school officials were not trying to avoid controversy in
making students remove their shirts, but the vice principal’s actions
could easily be seen as motivated primarily by a desire to limit political
speech that ran counter to the school’s desire to avoid political controversy and celebrate Cinco de Mayo.148 Both the majority and concurrence in Morse demonstrate a strong aversion to the regulation of
political student speech simply because the school disapproves of the
message.149 Indeed, the speech in Dariano can be construed as the kind
of social commentary which the Morse concurrence explicitly discusses.
The majority in Dariano would surely counter that Tinker exclusively
141

Id. at 777.
Id. at 778.
143 Id.
144 See Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 38 n.11 (10th Cir. 2013)
(“Moreover, there is no indication in this case that the problematic student disruptions were
aimed at stopping plaintiffs’ expression, and plaintiffs did not otherwise develop such an
argument.”).
145 See discussion supra Section I.B.
146 Dariano, 767 F.3d at 779.
147 See id. at 776 (“We analyze the students’ claims under the well-recognized framework
of Tinker . . . ”).
148 Id. at 777.
149 See discussion supra Section II.C.
142
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governs cases where school officials claim to be acting to avoid substantial disruptions to the educational process, to the exclusion of both the
heckler’s veto doctrine and other school speech jurisprudence.150
B. The Dissent
Three judges dissented from the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Dariano,
primarily on the grounds that the heckler’s veto was implicated in the
case and that the source of the threatened disruption was relevant to the
analysis.151 Writing for the dissent, Judge O’Scannlain argued that “far
from abandoning the heckler’s veto doctrine in public schools, Tinker
stands as a dramatic reaffirmation of it.”152 The dissent emphasized that
the government cannot consider an audience’s negative reaction to be a
basis for the suppression of speech, and claimed that the majority was
incorrect in saying that the other circuit courts have not distinguished
between disruptions caused by speakers and audiences in their heckler’s
veto cases.153
Judge O’Scannlain posited that the actions of school officials and
the majority’s decision gave students the message that “by threatening
violence against those with whom you disagree, you can enlist the power
of the State to silence them.”154 He contrasts this “perverse incentive”
with the goal of the heckler’s veto doctrine, which is to protect unpopular
speech from suppression.155 O’Scannlain channels Tinker by offering a
broader defense of student speech rights as necessary to preserve the
“hazardous freedom” and “openness” which characterize a healthy discussion.156 These arguments seem to implicate Morse’s considerations of
when it is proper to regulate the political speech of students, and implicitly reject the majority’s singular use of the Tinker substantial disruption
standard in deciding the case.
C. The Circuit Split
The dissent in Dariano was correct to note that the court’s ruling
created a split with the Seventh and Tenth Circuits on the issue of
whether the heckler’s veto doctrine has any relevance in a Tinker sub150 However, there is ample evidence in the Tinker ruling to suggest that the Court did not
consider the substantial disruption test to be a one-size-fits-all solution to potentially disruptive
student speech. See infra Part IV.
151 See Dariano, 767 F.3d at 766.
152 Id. at 769.
153 See id. at 771. This difference of opinion over whether there is a difference between
audience-caused and speaker-caused disruptions appears to drive the split between the majority and the dissent in Dariano, and merits further examination. See infra Part IV.
154 Dariano, 767 F.3d at 770.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 769 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09).
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stantial disruption analysis. To begin with, the Ninth Circuit has already
applied the heckler’s veto doctrine in a case with a public school setting.
In Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, the court ruled that the disruptive reactions of middle school students to a pro-life protest could not be used as a
basis for suppressing the protest, which had taken place on public property adjacent to the school.157 The Ninth Circuit refused to create a minors exception to the heckler’s veto in school settings, despite the
government’s argument that the court was threatening to “substantially
limit the power of government to protect the school environment.”158
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case, and in doing so seemed
to reject the appellants’ request that the Court fashion an exception to the
heckler’s veto doctrine.159
None of this is to say that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Dariano was
necessarily inconsistent with Center for Bio-Ethical Reform; indeed,
there are important factual dissimilarities between the two cases, including the exact location of the expression in question and the age and status
of the speakers. However, Center for Bio-Ethical Reform shows that the
Ninth Circuit is well aware of the heckler’s veto and does not dismiss out
of hand the idea that it could apply in a school setting.160 The question
becomes why the Court chose not to take the next logical step in Dariano
and grant public school students heckler’s veto protections. From the
opinion, it seems as though the court’s fixation on Tinker as the sole
standard by which cases involving disruptive student speech could be
resolved precluded a deeper heckler’s veto analysis.
Regardless of the rationale behind the majority’s decision not to extend their Center for Bio-Ethical Reform ruling in Dariano, their decision creates a clear split with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. The
Dariano majority attempted to justify their refusal to apply the heckler’s
veto doctrine by pointing to Tinker and the unique characteristics of the
school environment, an approach that is rejected by the other circuits.161
While the courts in Holloman and Zamecnik both utilized a Tinker analysis, they rejected the idea that student reactions to the peaceful expressions of their classmates were an appropriate basis upon which to strip
the latter of their rights.162 The Zamecnik court in particular argued that
157

See supra Section I.A.2.
Application in School Setting of “Heckler’s Veto” Ban on Content-Restrictive Regulations, U.S. SUP. CT. ACTIONS 16, Jan. 15, 2009.
159 See id.
160 See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 790 (9th Cir.
2008) (noting that there is no minors’ exception to the heckler’s veto).
161 See Dariano, 767 F.3d at 778.
162 See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“Statements that while not fighting words are met by violence or threats or other unprivileged
retaliatory conduct by persons offended by them cannot lawfully be suppressed because of that
conduct.”); Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (“If
158
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the disruption created by such harassment should not even be considered
in the Tinker analysis.163 The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits also rejected
the idea that the public school context strips students of all heckler’s veto
protections; on the contrary, the courts emphasized the value of debate in
the school context and the need to avoid “turning a blind eye to basic
notions of right and wrong.”164 While both courts agree with the Ninth
Circuit that a degree of deference must be granted to school officials’
determinations of what constitutes a disruption, they stringently reject the
notion that this deference requires that basic First Amendment protections such as the heckler’s veto be cast aside.165
The circuits also disagree on the question of whether Tinker’s substantial disruption test covers any real or potential disruption caused by
student expression or only those that do not arise directly from the speakers but from the audience, as was the case in Dariano. The Ninth Circuit
clearly favors the former approach, as in Dariano they explicitly noted
their belief that “[i]n the school context, the crucial distinction is the
nature of the speech, not the source of it.”166 The court claimed that there
is no basis for a distinction between a disruption caused by the speaker
and one caused by onlookers.167 The Eleventh Circuit implicitly disagreed with this interpretation in Holloman, as it found student expression to be constitutionally protected when the speaker does not
“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”168 This disagreement was a
key factor in how the circuits resolved the issue of the heckler’s veto in
their respective decisions.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court passed up its first chance to resolve this circuit split when it denied certiorari in Dariano.169 The
Court’s decision to deny certiorari in both Center for Bio-Ethical Reform
and Dariano is impossible to interpret with certainty, but it seems to fit
into the larger pattern of the Court hesitating to clarify the school speech
doctrine in the wake of Morse and its fallout.170 Until it does so, the
the people, acting through a legislative assembly, may not proscribe certain speech, neither
may they do so acting individually as criminals. Principals have the duty to maintain order in
public schools, but they may not do so while turning a blind eye to basic notions of right and
wrong.”).
163 See Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 879.
164 Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1276.
165 See supra Section I.A.2.
166 Dariano, 767 F.3d at 778.
167 See id.
168 Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1276.
169 See Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Rejects Free Speech Appeal over Cinco de
Mayo School Dispute, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-court-censorship-idUSKBN0MQ1JD20150330.
170 See supra Part II.C.
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question of the heckler’s veto’s applicability in public school settings
will remain one of the many murky areas of the Court’s school speech
jurisprudence.
IV. TOWARDS

A

MORE WORKABLE SCHOOL SPEECH DOCTRINE

If the Supreme Court’s goal in Morse was to clarify its school
speech jurisprudence, then it has failed utterly, if not in the initial fractured decision, then in its refusal to hear another school speech case since
then. Since the decision was handed down, courts have struggled to determine the breadth of its protections for the political speech of students.171 The importance of Morse for the circuit split over the heckler’s
veto is not immediately apparent, given that the Tinker substantial disruption test was central to each circuit’s analysis.172 However, the Court
cannot effectively resolve the heckler’s veto issue in public schools without dealing with the issues raised in Morse. Does political student speech
need to be analyzed differently under Tinker? Does it merit heckler’s
veto protections? How much latitude should be given to school authorities in their regulation of political speech? These are all questions which
float around both the Court’s school speech jurisprudence and the circuit
split over the heckler’s veto, and they must all be answered for either
area of the law to be clarified.
A. The Supreme Court Should Overturn the Ninth Circuit’s Decision
in Dariano
To begin with, the Court should overturn the Ninth Circuit’s flawed
ruling in Dariano. The Dariano majority couched its decision in the language of deference to school officials and to the seemingly all-encompassing precedent of Tinker, arguing that their “role was not to secondguess . . . the precautions put in place to avoid violence where the school
reasonably forecast substantial disruption or violence.”173 The court’s admonition that “deference does not mean abdication” rings somewhat
hollow given its curt dismissal of the dissent’s arguments that restrictions
on peaceful student expression should be considered more carefully.174
However, a close reading of Tinker reveals that the Dariano court’s use
of it to dismiss the applicability of the heckler’s veto was incorrect. In
fact, the case can easily be read as an early affirmation of the heckler’s
171

See id.
See Dariano, 636 F.3d at 776 (“We analyze the students’ claims under the well-recognized framework of Tinker . . . .”); Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 876 (noting that the school must
satisfy the Tinker substantial disruption standard to justify its restrictions on student speech);
Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1273 (“Consequently, we apply the Tinker . . . doctrine in this case.”).
173 Dariano, 767 F.3d at 779.
174 Id.
172
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veto doctrine. The school officials in Tinker were primarily concerned
with the reactions to the Tinkers’ armbands from students who disagreed
with their message.175 In response, the Tinker Court defended the students’ rights to speech from suppression based on school officials’ “urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the
expression.”176 The Ninth Circuit’s use of Tinker turns it from a case
which implicitly endorses the heckler’s veto doctrine to one which completely locks out any sort of heckler’s veto analysis as inapplicable.
The Ninth Circuit’s belief that Tinker’s substantial disruption test
applies equally to disruptions caused by both speakers and their audiences is mistaken. When it lays out the limits of the expressive rights of
students, the Tinker court argues that “conduct by the student, in class or
out of it, which for any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.”177 In this passage, the Court is clearly focusing on actions by
the speaker that would remove his speech from the sphere of constitutional protection, not audience reactions that might do so. Indeed, the
Tinker Court’s “focus on the protesting students’ behavior—not the reaction of third parties, which is largely outside of the protestors’ control—
is clear” throughout its analysis.178 In Blackwell v. Issaquena County
Board of Education, a school speech case cited by the Tinker Court, the
Fifth Circuit similarly focused on the behavior and actions of the speakers in a school speech case, in this case declining to enjoin school officials’ restriction of student expression on the grounds that the speakers
harassed other students and created a significant disturbance.179 Clearly,
the Tinker court distinguished disruptions arising directly from student
speech from disruptions that arise from reactions to that speech. Dariano
is mistaken in its interpretation of Tinker,180 while Holloman and
Zamecnik, as we have seen, are more faithful to the Tinker Court’s intent
in establishing the substantial disruption standard.181
In the end, Tinker cannot be separated entirely from the heckler’s
veto doctrine, deference to school officials notwithstanding. If students
do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expres175

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969).
Id.
177 Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
178 Alliance Defending Freedom Brief, supra note 35, at *12.
179 See Blackwell v. Issaquena Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966).
180 The Tinkers believe that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was based on a flawed understanding of their case. See Tinker Brief, supra note 105, at 13 (“The [Dariano decision] undermines constitutional values by teaching law-abiding students that the peaceful must surrender
their rights in the face of hostility from the violent. Nothing could be more antithetical to First
Amendment principles, especially in view of recent events.”).
181 See supra Part III.C.
176

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-2\CJP204.txt

414

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 26

PUBLIC POLICY

24-APR-17

10:35

[Vol. 26:389

sion at the schoolhouse gate,” then it is only logical to provide students
with the protection of First Amendment doctrines such as the heckler’s
veto, at least to a reasonable extent.182 The judiciary has long highlighted
the importance of preserving rights for students, who at their age are only
just beginning to engage with the rights and responsibilities bestowed on
them by the Constitution.183 The Tinker Court understood this, and it is
up to the present Court to reaffirm the case’s strong protections for student expression. In defining exactly what these protections should be, the
Court will have to move beyond precedent and synthesize its existing
doctrine.
B. The Court Should Reaffirm Student Speech Rights and Reform
Their School Speech Jurisprudence
If the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Dariano is indeed incorrect, the
Supreme Court must then elucidate a clear reformulation of its school
speech doctrine. Merely affirming the Zamecnik and Holloman decisions
will not be sufficient, as the implications of extending the heckler’s veto
doctrine to student speech would go beyond the treatment which the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits give the issue in their decisions. The Court’s
overall goal should be to avoid what happened after Morse, when a fractured decision led to uncertainty about the state of the doctrine and divergent rulings in lower courts.184 The status quo does nothing to help
school teachers and administrators understand how to permissibly regulate student speech. Some scholars have begun to propose ways for the
Court to resolve this jurisprudential mess, but the rise of the heckler’s
veto circuit split adds a new dimension to the issue and provides the
Court with an opportunity to rationalize its relevant jurisprudence.185
This Note proposes something of a harmonization of the Tinker and
Morse areas of the school speech doctrine, although not a merger, as that
would be impracticable given the substantive differences between the situations to which the cases respond.
First, the Court should make it clear that its overall goal in clarifying its school speech jurisprudence does not dramatically interfere with
the deference traditionally given to school officials. It is indisputable that
182

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
See W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“That [schools]
are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”).
184 See supra Part II.C.
185 See, e.g., Raley, supra note 103, at 797–98 (laying out a multifactor balancing test for
what kinds of student speech should be restricted); Schoedel, supra note 125, at 1658–59
(advocating an interpretation of Morse which embraces Alito’s concurrence but allows schools
to ban speech which meets the definition of fighting words).
183
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the school environment is not identical to the average public space, and
that “[t]he very nature of public education requires limitations on one’s
personal liberty in order for the learning process to succeed.”186 Additionally, the Court must propose a workable standard which does not
impose a heavy burden on the school officials who will have to interpret
and enforce it. In Dariano, Judge O’Scannlain effectively critiqued the
majority’s opinion but failed to offer a realistic replacement standard.187
These are the challenges which I will try to deal with in proposing a
potential roadmap for the Court to consider in revising its school speech
jurisprudence.
Any revisions to the school speech doctrine should focus exclusively on speech with some sort of political or social message or commentary, as this is the type of speech that traditionally has merited the
greatest level of protection in the courts and other types of speech are
thus best left to school administrators to regulate. The Tinker substantial
disruption doctrine should be maintained, but updated to explicitly incorporate heckler’s veto doctrine principles, as the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits have already done. The new substantial disruption standard
would, in the case of political speech, only govern disruptions by the
speakers unless the speech also constituted fighting words or a clear,
express attempt to bully or hurt fellow students. The American flag tshirts in Dariano would thus be permissible, but not shirts emblazoned
with messages like “Mexicans go home” or “America is for Americans.”
Additionally, symbols which have blatantly offensive connotations, such
as swastikas, would be impermissible regardless of context. This standard would allow schools to use their own guidelines on bullying and
misbehavior to decide when a student’s political speech becomes inappropriate. Of course, it would then be up to the courts to prevent schools
from using this discretion to create overbroad guidelines that have the
effect of chilling all political speech. Overall, then, Morse’s heightened
concerns about protecting political speech and Justice Alito’s specific
desire to avoid having schools pick and choose which messages students
could disseminate would be incorporated into the substantial disruption
standard via a de facto heckler’s veto doctrine.
The Court should simultaneously reassert that Morse was a narrow
ruling regarding speech that encourages drug use and other illegal activity. Justice Alito’s admonition that schools should not be allowed to use
some vague “educational mission” to ban certain types of political
speech should be adopted by the Court at large.188 Discretion cannot be
186 Todd A. DeMitchell, Frudden v. Pilling: The School Uniform and Compelled Speech,
312 ED. LAW REP. 1, 7 (2015).
187 See Ninth Circuit Denies Motion to Rehear, supra note 4, at 2070.
188 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 (2007).
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allowed to become a broad license to limit political speech, subject only
to the most cursory judicial overview. At any rate, all political speech
that doesn’t explicitly encourage violent or illegal activity would be analyzed under the revised Tinker substantial disruption standard, subject as
well to the specific limitations imposed by Bethel and Kuhlmeier. All
speech, political or not, encouraging drug use, violence, or other illegal
activities would remain within Morse’s sphere. This new system would
have numerous advantages over the current doctrine, as it would more
forcefully guarantee student political speech rights, protect students from
bullying without unduly limiting their exposure to diverse opinions, resolve the issue of the heckler’s veto’s applicability in the classroom, clarify the Court’s school speech jurisprudence, and create certainty for
teachers and administrators who would no longer have to wonder what a
court would say about their actions.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs in Dariano are perhaps not the most sympathetic
fighters for free speech rights, given the ulterior motives one could read
into their actions and their status as high school students. However, the
role of the First Amendment is to protect unpopular speech, as this is the
kind of speech which provokes the debate and discussion which are so
essential to the healthy functioning of a liberal democracy. The free
speech rights of public schools are not and cannot be coterminous with
those of adults, nor can they be cavalierly tossed aside under the guise of
deference towards and respect for strained school officials. However, the
muddled state of the Supreme Court’s school speech jurisprudence and
its failure to resolve the outstanding circuit split on the issue of the heckler’s veto in public schools have created a situation where lower courts
are free to do exactly that.
The intentions of courts such as the Ninth Circuit in limiting student
speech rights are doubtlessly noble: they wish to help school administrators and teachers create safe and productive learning environments in
which students can maximize their potential. However, in limiting student speech rights they fail to understand that the freedoms enshrined in
the Bill of Rights are not always clean and proper. Schools should not
become places where students are sheltered from every reality of the
outside world, or from views with which they might disagree. Peaceful
student speech that comments on social or political issues in a manner
that does not bully classmates should not be subject to blanket restrictions, even if such speech prompts an angry, disruptive reaction. Schools
are places of learning, and our public schools have a special duty to educate the nation’s youth not just in math, science, and reading, but in the
values and norms which guide public discourse in the United States. Stu-
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dents who believe that disruption and suppression is the best way to respond to views with which they disagree should not be humored by
school officials, but rather prevented from acting in such a manner and
reprimanded for doing so. The role of the government is to protect speakers and their rights, not to aid and abet those who would see such speech
silenced. To submit to the heckler’s veto of young students would create
a dangerous precedent in each of their minds, one which could have a
chilling effect on everyone’s speech in a potentially illiberal future.
Tinker, just like the heckler’s veto doctrine itself, is rooted in the
spirit and thinking of the civil rights era, when the judiciary acted decisively to protect and enforce previously neglected rights. In recent years,
the Supreme Court failed to clearly articulate this animating rationale
behind its school speech jurisprudence, with the result being that the
rights of students to free expression have been eroded in lower courts. It
now falls once more to the Court to defend the rights of those who cannot effectively represent themselves and to use the heckler’s veto circuit
split to clearly establish meaningful protections for students whose
peaceful, respectful political speech faces suppression at the hands of
disruptive classmates and nervous school officials. Freedom of speech is
a right to be celebrated for the revolutionary idea that it is, not merely
tolerated as a necessary nuisance.
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